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Abstract
This paper concerns international coordination of environmental taxation.
The main contribution of the paper is to provide a frame-work for dynamic
cost benefit analysis of environmental tax reforms in a global economy with
transboundary environmental problems. We show that the welfare effects of
green tax reform in a multi-country economy may differ substantially from
earlier results associated with representative agent models, where the
transboundary aspect of the environmental problems is neglected.
JEL Classification: D61, D62, H21, I31.

















It is a conventional wisdom that the overall - or global - welfare level will
increase, if countries cooperate instead of forming their environmental poli-
cies in isolation. The reason is that the polluting behavior of agents in one
country a¤ects the wellbeing of consumers in other countries. In the absence
of cooperation, part of the external e¤ects of environmental damage will re-
main uninternalized, even if all other policies are designed in an optimal way
from society’s point of view.
In practice, however, ’cooperation’ is not likely to mean the implemen-
tation of a …rst best cooperative equilibrium. It is more realistic to as-
sume that the countries agree upon smaller projects1, the purposes of which
are to (slightly) improve the resource allocation in comparison with the ini-
tial equilibrium. This paper concerns cooperation over environmental policy
by studying the welfare consequences of an agreement between countries to
change their emission taxes.
Following Brock (1977), Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993) and others,
we shall assume that the environmental damage arises from a stock of pol-
lution, which necessitates the use of an intertemporal model. The main
contribution of the paper is to provide a framework for dynamic cost bene…t
analysis of environmental tax reforms in a global economy, where the pre-
reform situation is generated by an imperfect market economy. Therefore,
contrary to most previous studies on ’international environmental policy’2,
the alternative to cooperation will not necessarily be the outcome of a non-
cooperative Nash-game between the countries. Such Nash-games typically
1The Rio (1992) and Kyoto (1997) agreements to reduce the release of CO2 emis-
sions are examples of such cooperative projects. The CO2 tax constitutes an important
instrument for implementation of these agreements.
2See e.g. Mäler (1989), Barrett (1990, 1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Cesar
(1994), Tahvonen (1994, 1995) and Mäler and de Zeeuw (1995).
2imply that the agents in each country behave as if the resource allocation
is decided upon by a ’national social planner’, who treats the outcome of
choices made by other countries as exogenous. As a consequence, any exter-
nalities that would otherwise arise from the release of emissions by domestic
producers will become fully internalized, whereas the externalities caused by
the interaction between countries remain uninternalized. Our analysis treats
the Nash equilibrium as one out of many possible prereform equilibria.
We shall not address the conditions under which coalitions are likely to
form. The main purpose is, instead, to study the global welfare consequences
that will arise, if the countries agree to slightly change their emission taxes.
This also enables us to examine conditions under which the optimal direction
of tax reform can be identi…ed. The analysis will be conducted in a dynamic
general equilibrium model, in which the ’global welfare level’ is measured by
a Benthamite welfare function de…ned over the countries involved.
We also compare the results with those from two of our previous stud-
ies; Aronsson and Löfgren (1999, 2000). The …rst of these earlier studies
addresses, among other things, the welfare e¤ect of higher emission taxa-
tion in the context of a ’one-country’ economy, whereas the second brie‡y
examines the welfare e¤ect of an agreement between countries to increase
their emission taxes when the prereform equilibrium is represented by the
outcome of a noncooperative Nash-game between individual countries. We
show that the cost bene…t analyses carried out in these earlier studies con-
stitute special cases of the more general cost bene…t rules derived here. The
comparison between a one-country economy and a multi-country economy is
particularly interesting from the point of view of environmental taxation. In
the context of a one-country economy, and if the prereform emission tax is
’too low’ in comparison with the marginal social cost of the environmental
damage caused by emissions, one can show that an increase in the emission
tax increases the welfare level. As will be made clear below, this result does
3not in general carry over to a multi-country economy: even if the prereform
emission tax in each individual country falls short of the marginal social
cost of the environmental damage caused by that particular country’s emis-
sions, implementation of an agreement to increase the emission taxes does
not necessarily improve the global welfare level.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we will present the
model as well as derive the noncooperative Nash equilibrium in open loop
form and the cooperative equilibrium. Even if these two equilibrium concepts
are not the basis for the analysis to follow, they constitute important refer-
ence cases by which to compare the market equilibrium. Section 3 introduces
the market equilibrium and contains the main results. Section 4 concludes
the paper.
2A R e f e r e n c e M o d e l
W eb e g i nt h i ss e c t i o nw i t hap r e s e n t a t i o no ft h em o d e l ,w h i c hi sb a s e do n
Aronsson and Löfgren (2000). We will then brie‡y characterize the equilib-
ria resulting from a noncooperative Nash-game in open loop form between
the countries and from full cooperation, respectively. Since the number of
countries is not important (as long as there is more than one country), we
simplify the analysis by studying a two-country economy. The population in
each country is constant and normalized to one.
2.1 The Model
The instantaneous utility function facing the consumer in country i, i =1 ;2,
takes the form
ui(t)=ui(ci(t);z i(t))
where ci(t) is consumption and zi(t) an indicator of environmental quality at
4time t. The instantaneous utility function is increasing, twice continuously
di¤erentiable and strictly concave in its arguments. If we denote the part
of the stock of pollution generated by production in country i by xi,t h e
indicator of environmental quality in country i is de…ned by the concave
function
zi(t)=zi(x1(t);x 2(t))
where @zi=@x1 < 0 and @zi=@x2 < 0 for all x1, x2.
Output is produced by labor (normalized to one), physical capital and
emissions (through the use of energy input). Net output is determined by
the production function
yi(t)=fi(ki(t);g i(t))
where ki is the capital stock per unit of labor and gi is energy per unit of
labor. We assume that the function fi(¢) is nondecreasing in gi,t w i c ec o n -
tinuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave. Since yi measures net output,
depreciation of physical capital can make the marginal product of capital
negative, provided the physical capital stock is large enough. The stock of
physical capital accumulates according to
_ ki(t)=fi(ki(t);g i(t)) ¡ ci(t) (1)
The stock of pollution accumulates through the release of emissions. In
the model, these originate from the production of energy. To simplify the
analysis, we will disregard the process of producing energy and assume that
emissions in country i at t are equal to gi(t), which means that the di¤erential
equation for xi(t) is written
_ xi(t)=gi(t) ¡ °xi(t) (2)
where ° i st h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o n .
52.2 The Nash Noncooperative Open Loop Solution
It is well known that di¤erential games are very di¢cult to solve analytically,
and that an equilibrium solution may not exist3. However, given that a
solution does exist, it turns out that envelope properties of the value function
enable us to derive a set of speci…c results relevant for cost bene…t analysis4.
To be able to carry out the welfare analysis, suppose to begin with that the
resource allocation in each country is decided upon by a planner, who takes
the path for the part of the stock of pollution created by the other country
as exogenous.






subject to the equations of motion for ki and xi, initial conditions ki(0) = ki0
and xi(0) = xi0 and terminal conditions limt!1 ki(t) ¸ 0 and limt!1 xi(t) ¸
0. The parameter µ represents the rate of time preference, which is assumed
to be the same in both countries.
T h ep r e s e n tv a l u eH a m i l t o n i a ni sw r i t t e n
Hi(t)=ui(ci(t);z i(t))e
¡µt + ¸i(t)_ ki(t)+¹i(t)_ xi(t) (3)
where ¸i and ¹i are present value shadow prices in terms of utility. In addition
to equations (1) and (2), as well as to the initial and terminal conditions, the
necessary conditions are (neglecting the time indicator)5
3Explicit solutions usually require a set of simplifying assumptions; see e.g. Lancaster
(1973), Hoel (1978), Clark (1980), Levhari and Mirman (1980), Dockner et al. (1985) and
Tahvonen (1994). In a more general setting, however, very few insights emerge (even in
terms of qualitative statements). One of the most comprehensive statements of the theory
has been provided by Basar and Olsder (1982).
4See also Löfgren (1999), who conducts cost bene…t analyses in the context of Nash
and Stackelberg di¤erential ’…sh games’ under open loop and feedback loop.
5The transversality conditions are necessary provided that certain growth conditions
6@ui(ci;z i)e¡µt
@ci




+ ¹i =0 (5)











t!1¸i ¸ 0( =0if lim
t!1ki > 0) (8)
lim
t!1¹i ¸ 0( =0if lim








i (t)), 8 t
solve planner i’s optimization problem. We de…ne (¤n
1(t);¤n
2(t)) for t 2 [0;1)
to be a Nash equilibrium, if
(i) f¤n
1(t)g1
0 solves the decision problem of country 1 conditional on ¤2(t)=
¤n
2(t) for all t,a n d
(ii) f¤n
2(t)g1
0 solves the decision problem of country 2 conditional on ¤1(t)=
¤n
1(t) for all t.
The superindex ”n” will be used throughout the paper to denote the nonco-
operative Nash equilibrium in open loop form.
Note that the Nash equilibrium concept only internalizes part of the wel-
fare e¤ect caused by emissions. Equation (7) implies that the shadow price
are ful…lled. These growth conditions serve as upper bounds on the in‡uence of the state
variables on the functions involved. For further details, the reader is referred to Seierstad
and Sydsaeter (1987, Theorem 16, Chapter 3).
7of pollution relevant for country i only re‡ects the utility e¤ects of pollu-
tion facing the consumer in country i, whereas the utility e¤ect relevant
for the consumer in the other country is neglected. According to equation
(5), the marginal product of emissions in the noncooperative equilibrium,
@fi(kn
i ;gn
i )=@gi,i se q u a lt o¡¹n
i =¸n
i , which is the shadow price of xi in real
terms. In the context of a market economy, ¡¹n
i =¸n
i is also interpretable as
an emission tax designed to make the market economy reproduce the nonco-
operative equilibrium.
2.3 The Cooperative Solution
To derive the cooperative solution, where the external e¤ects are fully in-
ternalized at the global level, suppose to begin with that a global planner
maximizes the sum6 of the countries’ utility functions, U1(0) and U2(0),s u b -
ject to equations of motion for the state variables (k1, k2, x1 and x2)a sw e l l
as to the initial and terminal conditions de…ned above.
Among the necessary conditions, we …nd7
@ui(ci;z i)e¡µt
@ci




+ ¹i =0 (11)















6This assumption is made to preserve simplicity, since we shall be concerned with
e¢ciency aspects of green tax reforms. Maximizing a more general welfare function would
not change anything essential.
7See footnote 5.
8lim
t!1¸i ¸ 0( =0if lim
t!1ki > 0) (14)
lim
t!1¹i ¸ 0( =0if lim
t!1xi > 0) (15)








for i =1 ;2 solve the planner’s optimization problem, where the superindex
”*” is used to denote the cooperative equilibrium.
By comparing these necessary conditions with those of the previous sub-
section, it is clear that the only formal di¤erence refers to the equation of
motion for the shadow price of pollution. In the cooperative equilibrium,
there are no remaining external e¤ects, since the shadow price of pollution
facing country i will re‡ect all utility e¤ects caused by that country’s pol-
luting behavior. In the context of a market economy, we would interpret
¡¹¤
i=¸¤
i as an emission tax designed to make the market economy replicate
the cooperative equilibrium.
3 T h eI m p e r f e c tM a r k e tE c o n o m y
It is convenient to begin with a brief description of the outcome in the con-
t r o l l e dm a r k e te c o n o m y .S u p p o s ea ne m i s s i o nt a x ,¿0
i (t), is imposed on the
…rm in each country, and that the tax revenues, ¿0
i (t)gi(t),a r eg i v e nt ot h e
consumer in the form of a lump-sum transfer. To take a short cut to the de-
centralized market equilibrium, note that the main di¤erence between a social
planner problem and a market economy is that xi is not treated as a state
variable by the agents in a decentralized setting. It is, instead, a side e¤ect
of the …rms’ production decisions, and its path is exogenous to the consumer.
The optimization problems facing the representative consumer and …rm in
9each country are presented in the Appendix. We shall here concentrate on
the equilibrium outcome of their behavior.
3.1 The Conditional Equilibrium
In addition to the initial condition for the physical capital stock and the



































for i =1 ;2,a n dt 2 [0;1), where the time indicator has been dropped
for notational convenience, and the superindex ”0” is used to denote the
market equilibrium. Note also that these conditions are general equilibrium
conditions, i.e. they are derived by combining the necessary conditions for
the consumer and the …rm. We assume that equations (16)-(19), together
with the other necessary conditions, constitute a unique equilibrium which
will be referred to as the conditional equilibrium, since it originates from the
assumption that the private agents in each country optimize conditional on
the emission tax path f¿0
i (t)g1
0 :
By comparing the conditional equilibrium - which is the outcome of a
market economy - with the two equilibrium concepts discussed in Section 2,
10it is easy to see that the latter two equilibria are special cases of the more
general conditional equilibrium. Formally8




i (t), 8 t and i =1 , 2,t h e
decentralized economies will reproduce the noncooperative Nash-equilibrium




i(t), 8 t and i =1 , 2,
the decentralized economies will replicate the cooperative equilibrium.
We shall refer to ¿n
i (t) as the ”noncooperative” Pigouvian tax and ¿¤
i (t) as
the ”full” Pigouvian tax for country i. To emphasize the di¤erence between
the two Pigouvian related emission tax paths even further, let us solve equa-
tions (7) and (13), respectively, subject to the transversality condition. This










































i (t) only takes into account that pollution in country i a¤ects the
utility of the consumer in country i (a consequence of the noncooperative
solution concept). The latter problem is absent at the global level in the
cooperative solution, because ¿¤
i (t), re‡ects all utility e¤ects of pollution
caused by country i.
3.2 Tax Reforms in the Conditional Equilibrium
In general, there is no reason to believe that the conditional equilibrium will
coincide with a noncooperative Nash equilibrium if the countries do not co-
ordinate their environmental policies. This is so because the implementation
8See Aronsson and Löfgren (2000) and van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992).
9We assume that the terminal conditions on the stocks of pollution are not binding, in
w h i c hc a s ew ec a nu s elimt!1 ¹n
i (t)=0and limt!1 ¹¤
i(t)=0 .
11of such an equilibrium would require enormous amounts of information: the
policy makers must be able to solve ’national’ command optimum problems
in order to design noncooperative Pigouvian taxes. In this subsection, we use
the conditional equilibrium represented by equations (16)-(19) as a starting
point for policy analysis. The purpose is to study what factors determine
the welfare consequences that arise, if the countries agree to slightly change
their emission taxes.
The initial tax structure is given by the paths f¿0
i (t)g1
0 for i =1 ;2.
We want to measure the welfare e¤ects of changing these emission taxes to
¿0
1(t)+® and ¿0
2(t)+¯, respectively, for all t,w h e r e® and ¯ are interpretable
as small constants. To focus on e¢ciency aspects of the tax reform, the
additional tax revenues in each country are given to the consumer in the
form of a lump-sum subsidy.




















where » is a parameter vector with ® and ¯ as two of its elements, while
V 0
i (0;») is the value (or maximized utility) function of country i.T h ec o s t
bene…t rules we are looking for can be obtained by di¤erentiating the value
function with respect to ® and ¯, respectively, and evaluating the resulting
derivatives at the points where ® =0and ¯ =0 . Our concern will then be







following the implementation of the agreement.
We will assume that the value function is di¤erentiable. It is then straight
forward to derive these measures by using the dynamic envelope theorem10.
We show in the Appendix that the cost bene…t rule for ® can be written as
































































where the parameter vector » and the time indicator have been suppressed
in order to avoid unnecessary notations.
In general, what causes a small change in taxation to a¤ect the welfare
level is that the tax was not optimally chosen prior to the reform. The only
preexisting distortions here refer to the possibly suboptimal use of emissions
in both countries: the emission tax paths f¿0
i (t)g1
0 , i =1 ;2, do not neces-
sarily re‡ect the disutility of pollution. Therefore, the global welfare e¤ect





whereas all other behavioral responses will vanish from the welfare measure
as a consequence of optimization. Note that the cost bene…t rule for ¯ is





































































To go further, it will be convenient to write each country’s emission tax as
if it is a ’biased estimate’ of the marginal value of the environmental damage
caused by that particular country’s emissions. Formally, the emission taxes
in the conditional equilibrium will be written as
and LaFrance and Barney (1991). A theorem on the di¤erentiability of the value function
in in…nite horizon optimal control problems, which has been derived by Atle Seierstad, is

























for all t,w h e r ei =1 ;2,a n dj 6= i.T h e t e r m bi(t) is the bias relevant
for country i at time t, i.e. the magnitude by which the actual emission
tax deviates from the correct valuation of the damages to the environment
caused by country i.
We can now derive a useful result;
Theorem: If the emission taxes in the conditional equilibrium take the form



























Proof: see the Appendix.
To evaluate the welfare e¤ect of the agreement to increase or decrease
the emission taxes permanently at time 0, we would require knowledge of
b1 and b2 for all t,a sw e l la sh o w® and ¯ a¤ect x0
1 and x0
2. Clearly, by
increasing the emission tax in one of the countries, we would expect the
…rms in that particular country to reduce their release of emissions, meaning
that @g0
1(t)=@® < 0 and @g0
2(t)=@¯ < 0,a l lt. In fact, if it was not possible
to reduce emissions via the tax system, the whole discussion about green





i(s)e°(s¡t)ds,w eh a v e@x0
1(t)=@® < 0
and @x0
2(t)=@¯ < 0,a l lt. However, it remains unclear how increased emission
taxation in country 1 (2) a¤ects x0
2 (x0
1), so the signs of the derivatives @x0
1=@¯
14and @x0
2=@® cannot be determined without additional information. This
has an interesting interpretation: even if the emission tax chosen by each
country underestimates the marginal damage to the environment caused by
that particular country’s emissions (i.e. even if b1 > 0 and b2 > 0 for all t),
it is not necessarily optimal to agree on higher emission taxation11.
To be able to relate the welfare e¤ect to the biases b1 and b2, one would
need to impose restrictions regarding how the environmental policy under-
taken by each country a¤ects the production decision of the other country.
This idea is used in Proposition 1 below12;




for i =1 ;2 and j 6= i,w h e r e·i, ½i
i and ½
j
i are constants. Then, if b1(t) > 0
and b2(t) > 0 for all t, we have @W0(0;»)=@® > 0 and @W0(0;»)=@¯ > 0.
The proof rests on the fact that, in the case of additive separability be-
tween goods, a change in ® (¯) will not a¤ect the marginal utility of con-
sumption in country 2 (1). Linearity will then imply that the emission tax
in country 1 (2) does not depend on x2 (x1). It follows that the ”ambiguous
parts” of the welfare change measure will vanish.
Although special, the case of additive separability and linearity implies
that the signs of the bias terms, b1 and b2, determine how the emission taxes
must be changed in order to improve the welfare level. It is welfare improv-
ing to increase (decrease) both emission taxes, if the prereform emission tax
11It is important to make a distinction between a small cooperative project - which is
the concern here - and implementation of the full cooperative equilibrium. If the prereform
emission taxes fall short of their full Pigouvian counterparts, a discrete tax increase towards
the ’Pigouvian levels’ will, of course, increase the welfare level.
12The assumption about functional form of the instantaneous utility function in Propo-
sition 1 may seem overly restrictive. In fact, it is su¢cient to assume that u1(¢) is additive
and linear in x2 and vice versa. At the same time, it would be somewhat peculiar to
assume that u1(¢) is nonlinear in x1 and linear in x2, which motivates the functional form
assumption underlying the proposition.
15paths systematically underestimate (overestimate) the marginal disutility of
pollution. As we mentioned above, however, if we were to relax the assump-
tions that the instantaneous utilities are additive and linear along the lines
of Proposition 1, this result will no longer necessarily apply. We cannot, in
general, rule out the possibility that higher emission taxation in, say, coun-
try 1 a¤ects x0
1 and x0
2 in opposite directions (the same argument applies to
higher emission taxation in country 2).
3.3 Some Other Special Cases
The theorem in the previous subsection also provides a generalization of the
results derived in previous studies. Most earlier studies on environmental
policy have (at least implicitly) assumed that environmental damage is a
’national’ problem by using representative agent models.I n t h e c o n t e x t o f
the framework set out above, this assumption would imply @zi=@xj =0for
i =1 ;2,a n dj 6= i. As a consequence, @W0(0;»)=@® = @V 0
1 (0;»)=@® and
@W0(0;»)=@¯ = @V 0
2 (0;»)=@¯. We can then use the theorem to establish the
following special case;
Corollary 1: If ui(ci;z i(x1;x 2)) = Ãi(ci;x i) for i =1 ;2, the cost bene…t































This special case was originally derived by Aronsson and Löfgren (1999)
in the context of a one-country economy. It has (at least) two interesting
implications; (i) if bi(t) > 0 for all t, it is always welfare improving to increase
the emission tax of country i, and (ii) if 0 · bi(t) < ¡@Ãi(c0
i(t);x 0
i(t))=@xi(t)
16for all t, then the conditional equilibrium (with suboptimal emission taxes
from society’s point of view) is welfare superior to the uncontrolled market
economy (without emission taxation). The upper bound of the interval for
t h eb i a st e r mi ss i m p l yt oa s s u r et h a t¿0
i (t) is a tax and not a subsidy.
We mentioned in the introduction that previous studies on international
environmental policies are often based on the assumption that the alterna-
tive to cooperation is the outcome of a noncooperative Nash-game between
’national social planners’. Aronsson and Löfgren (2000) analyze the welfare
e¤ect of an agreement among countries to increase their emission taxes, when
the prereform equilibrium is the outcome of a noncooperative Nash-game in
open loop form. By comparing equations (7) and (23), it is apparent that
such a Nash-game will imply bi = ¡[@uj(¢)=@zj][@zj(¢)=@xi] for i =1 ;2,a n d























































Recall that the noncooperative Nash equilibrium in Section 2 means that
any externalities that would otherwise arise from the release of emissions by
domestic producers become internalized, whereas the externalities which are
due to the interaction among countries remain uninternalized. As a conse-
quence, one would expect the cost bene…t rule to re‡ect interaction e¤ects
across countries from changes in their emission taxes. According to equations
(24) and (25), this is precisely what happens, since ® and ¯ a¤ect u1(¢) via
x2 and u2(¢) via x1. All other behavioral e¤ects of higher emission taxation
vanish from the welfare change measure as a consequence of optimization
on a national basis. Nevertheless, even if the prereform equilibrium is the
17outcome of a noncooperative Nash-game, an agreement to slightly increase
the emission taxes can change the overall welfare level in either direction13.
However, under the conditions of Proposition 1 - with the instantaneous
utility function being additive in arguments as well as linear in x1 and
x2 - equations (24) and (25) will of course imply @Wn(0;»)=@® > 0 and
@Wn(0;»)=@¯ > 0. Another implication will be that the national welfare
e¤ect of each reform vanishes, i.e. @V n
1 (0;»)=@® =0and @V n
2 (0;»)=@¯ =0 .
The positive global welfare e¤ect originates from the in‡uence of ® on coun-
try 2 (via the decrease in x1)a n do f¯ on country 1 (via the decrease in x2).
In other words, if the policy maker in one country does not believe that the
other country will stick to the agreement, he/she will have no incentive to
increase the emission tax.
4 Discussion
It is sometimes argued that cooperation between countries with regard to
environmental policy is preferable to the case where each individual country
forms its policy in isolation. Indeed, if cooperation means implementation of
a full cooperative equilibrium, this argument is correct. In practice, however,
cooperation is not likely to mean that countries pool their resources in order
to implement such an equilibrium concept. It is more realistic to assume that
countries agree upon smaller projects (such as e.g. the Rio and/or Kyoto
agreements), the purpose of which are to improve the resource allocation in
13A similar qualitative result will emerge, if the open loop assumption were to be replaced
by a feedback loop assumption. However, as indicated by Jensen and Lockwood (1998), it
may be somewhat restrictive to assume di¤erentiability of the value function in a feedback
loop Nash equilibrium. They show, within a class of linear-quadratic di¤erential games,
that the value function may be discontinuous even if the game itself has a very simple
structure. They also provide su¢cient conditions for di¤erentiability, which turn out to
be related to the conditions for a unique equilibrium.
18comparison with the initial equilibrium. We have, in this paper, analyzed
the welfare consequences of such a project; namely, the welfare e¤ects of an
agreement among countries to slightly change their emission taxes.
The main result summarized by Theorem 1 relates the welfare e¤ects of
changes in the emission taxes to (i) the magnitude by which the preexisting
emission taxes deviate from the marginal social damage of pollution, and
(ii) how the emission taxes a¤ect the stocks of pollution accumulated in
each country. It is particularly interesting to compare the results with those
arising in representative agent models (or one-country economies), which
have often been used in previous studies on the e¤ects of green taxes. In
the context of a one-country economy - and with no distortions other than
environmental damage arising from production - one would normally …nd
that welfare increases monotonically with the emission tax as long as this tax
falls short of the value of the marginal externality. One of the main insights
here is that this result does not in general carry over to a multi-country
economy, where the environmental policies undertaken by one country are
likely to a¤ect the production decisions in other countries.
This means that, even if all preexisting emission taxes fall short of the
value of the externalities created by emissions in each country, and although
the cooperative equilibrium is welfare superior to any other equilibrium, a
small step towards the cooperative equilibrium does not necessarily increase
the global welfare level. Therefore, global externalities are likely to com-
plicate environmental policy considerably and in ways not recognized by
previous research.
195 Appendix
The private agents’ optimization problems









ki (t)=¼i(t)+ri(t)ki(t)+wi(t)+Ti(t) ¡ ci(t) (A2)





ri(s)ds) ¸ 0 (A4)
where wi is labor income, ri the interest rate, ¼i pro…t income (the consumer
owns the …rms) and Ti a lump-sum transfer. The consumer treats zi, wi, ri,
¼i and Ti as exogenous during optimization. Equation (A4) is a so called ’No
Ponzi Game’ condition.
T h er e p r e s e n t a t i v e… r mt r e a t swi and ri as exogenous and behaves as if
it chooses ki(t) and gi(t) to maximize
¼i(t)=fi(ki(t);g i(t)) ¡ ri(t)ki(t) ¡ ¿i(t)gi(t) ¡ wi(t) (A5)
where ¿i is an emission tax.
Finally, the tax revenues from the emission tax are returned lump-sum
to the consumer, which means that
¿i(t)gi(t)=Ti(t) (A6)
20The cost bene…t rule given by equation (21)
By di¤erentiating equation (20) with respect to ® and evaluating the resulting































































where the time indicator and the vector » have been suppressed at the right
hand side of equation (A7). To be able to rewrite equation (A7) into the



























with i =1 ;2,w h e r ef0
i (¢)=fi(k0
i;g 0
i) and the last equality comes from







































since ki(0) is …xed and limt!1 ¸0
i(t)=0is the transversality condition cor-
responding to the market equilibrium. By solving equation (A8) for @c0
i=@®,
substituting into equation (A7), and then using equations (18) and (A9),
gives equation (21).
Proof of the theorem
With equation (21) at our disposal, let us begin by di¤erentiating equation

















By assuming that the emission tax function, ¿0
i (t), is di¤erentiable with re-
spect to time, and that ¿0
i (t) approaches a …nite number when t goes to




























































since xi(0) is …xed. By solving equation (A10) for @g0
i=@®, substituting into







































































where the time indicator has been suppressed for notational convenience.






















for i =1 ;2 and j 6= i, and the time indicator has been suppressed once again.
Substituting equation (A13) into equation (A12) gives the cost bene…t rule
22for ® in the theorem. The cost bene…t rule for ¯ can be derived in a similar
way.
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